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During the summer of 1978, the capitals of Europe buzzed with po­
litical economic activity. The highlight of the summer was the 
Bremen summit of the world's major economic powers. A "headline 
grabber" in many ways, this summit threw many of the other acti­
vities into the shade.
In Brussels, the latest in the long list of woes afflicting the 
European textile industry confronted the European Commission. The 
problem was one of industrial overcapacity of the European man­
made fibres industry. Estimates of the overcapacity ran as high 
as 30 per cent. The solution, suggested the Commission, would be 
a market-sharing arrangement among the 11 major producers in the 
European fibre industry — an arrangement in clear conflict with 
the competition rules within the European Community.
In Vienna, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
was confronting a flood of new oil from both North
Sea and Alaskan sources. A new spirit of cooperation with the 
Western World (and the oil majors) seemed well under way when the 
major OPEC producers decided against abandonment of the US dollar 
as the main currency of settlement in the oil industry — despite 
the dollar's decline in world currency markets.
In Pireaus, an international ship exhibition was the scene of 
discussions as to the forming of a tanker cartel. The cartel, 
"Intertank", was initiated by the Norwegians and had as its formal 
objective the laying up of a sizable portion of the world tanker 
fleet in order to make the over-all business a money earner once 
again. Of the forty million tons deemed necessary for the schemes 
success, the organizers had procured one-half the necessary amount 
and were awaiting a Greek response to the scheme. A similar cartel 
for bulk carriers, "Intercargo" was also being muted, but accord-
1) See especially Rhys David, "A Prescription to make EEC Fibres Healthy 
Again”, Financial Times, June 23, 1978, p. 20.
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ing to the Financial Times, "the outlook for such a scheme is not
2)bright as progress has just begun".
No less a scene of hectic diplomatic activity was Geneva. Here 
the final stages of the Tokyo Round were being commenced — a 
round which had begun with great fanfare in September 1973.
There are two ironies to this contrast between the continued 
advocacy of freer and more liberal trade and the initiation of 
market sharing regimes in oil, textiles, and shipping. The first 
of these ironies is that the Western World apparently would like 
to"have its cake and eat it too". Creeping "cartelization" and 
freer trade are not seen in terms of contradiction — but rather 
in terms of a supplementary economic dirigism. The second irony — 
more a tragedy really — is that the significance of these deve­
lopments is perhaps much greater for developing nations than it 
is for OECD nations. The Tokyo Round had begun with ringing decla­
rations of faith by the GATT countries in the "need for special 
measures ... to assist the developing countries in their efforts 
to increase their export earnings", in the need to grant these 
countries a "generalized system of tariff preferences", and in the 
need for "special and more favorable" treatment of developing
3) nations. It was now ending in a flurry of activity; all promises 
on a general privileged LDC access to the markets of the developed 
nations had been forgotten in Geneva and were being undermined in 
Brussels, Pireaus,and in Vienna.
Particularly odd from the developing nations point of view is 
the fact that it is in these three areas: textiles, oil (and raw 
materials in general), and shipping that efforts have been made 
by UNCTAD nations to better their lot. As shown elsewhere in this 
volume, there has been a considerable influence from the current 
theories of development on the manner in which the Third World 
poses its demands. Whether these demands are successful or not 
will depend largely on the problem of access to the markets of 
the Western World.
2) "Bulk ship owners to discuss need for forming cartels", Financial Times 
June 5, 1978, p. 40. See also "U.S. Shipping policy hits trade relations". 
Financial Times June 6, 1978, p. 44.
3) Sidley Golt, "Special or Free and Secure Access to Markets for Developing 
Countries", The World Economy I (1) October, 1977, pp. 55, 58-59.
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1. The Problem of Access: A Market Structure Point of View
There would apparently be two views of "access""in international 
economics. The conventional economic point of view would be to 
analyze the problem of access as being one of nominal (or effective) 
tariffs, of quotas, of Governmental excise taxes, and of other non­
tariff barriers. These measures all have one thing in common — 
they are seen to discriminate against goods, first and foremost, 
but also perhaps labor and capital as factors of production. An­
other view of access cuts across this first view: access is seen 
as the problem of -gaining entrance to an international market 
which is dominated by oligopolistic firms, cartels, licensing 
arrangements, and marketing "understandings". It is this latter 
view, that provided by market structure, which we intend to exa­
mine .
There are many structural barriers to entry in most internation­
al markets which have little to do with the presence or absence of 
trade barriers. Many products marketed in developed economies are 
highly differentiated. Brand names proliferate at a rate only mar­
ginally slower than that of the proverbial fruitfly. For establish­
ed firms this is an expenditure which can be borne, for a new en­
trant, it presents a barrier. The entrant whether from within the 
same national economy or from abroad must spend considerable sums 
of money in order to ween consumers away from competing establish­
ed brands. For a textile firm from Korea or Taiwan, all too often, 
there is an additional bias, that of the developed country consumer 
against products manufactures with "cheap labour".
More important than the subtlety of market differentiation is 
the problem presented by economies of scale. Here too, a relative­
ly advanced export-oriented industry in a developing nation is 
placed at a disadvantage. Unless, one possesses the industrial 
base of a Japan, it is hard to envision the successful development 
of an export oriented automobile industry. Similar disadvantages 
exist for other critical sectors: computers, petrochemicals, steel, 
electronics, and the aircraft and aerospace industries. That 
tariffs on EEC imports from LDCs (lesser developed countries) 
in these sectors are among the lowest in the Brussels Treaty 
Nomenclature is perfectly understandable. European industry has 
the least to worry about in precisely these areas.
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Vertical integration is yet another barrier to market entry. 
The hold of the oil companies over OPEC, of the copper companies 
over CIPEC, of aluminium companies over the IBA are familiar sto­
ries in this regard. In each of these areas, LDC efforts through 
their producer organizations have been effective in increasing 
only the prices of the raw materials involved. The ultimate mar­
keting of petrochemicals, of copper wire and of aluminum pots 
and pans remains securely in the hands of the multinational cor­
porations involved.
Product differentiation, economies of scale, vertical integra­
tion — these are only the tip of the iceberg. In addition to other 
formal barriers to entry of the LDCs to the markets of developed 
countries — patents, government contracts, exclusive dealing re­
lationships between buyers and producers, there is a wealth of 
developed country policies which tend to favor domestic industries. 
Such support can take many forms: outright subsidization, special 
financing arrangements, tax concessions, the provision of invest­
ment infrastructure — plants, housing, roads, power, and the 
like; the end result is the same in all. cases — an active dis­
crimination against exports from developed nations. To ä large 
degree, however, it might be claimed that the large multinationals 
are partially exempt from this sort of exclusion. As investors, 
they too can partake of the supply of public goods as "domestic" 
industries of the developed countries concerned.
It would be mistaken to regard an argument for another form of 
"access" analysis — one based on market structure rather than one 
based on tariff and non-tariff barriers — as merely an exercise 
in economic radicalism. One could just as well argue that such an 
approach could be significant for economic theory in general.
This is for two reasons:
(1) It is easier for multinational corporations, in many instances, 
to invest in the Third World than it is for native Third World 
industries to gain an export foothold in Western economies. This 
has a crucial impact on Third World exports. In the table below, 
the foreign participation in some critical industrial sectors is 
illustrated. Dubious though this material may be statistically, 
it does show the degree of foreign control in some of the industri­









































































The question remains: to what degree are Third World exports to 
OECD nations the products of domestic national or cottage indu­
stries and to what degree are they the result of multinational in­
vestment in a location where the factors of production are such 
so that the multinational corporation is the de facto exporter, 
exporting to either its own branches elsewhere in the world or to 
its oligopoly competitors in the world today? A partial answer can 
be seen in the recent UN study on transnational corporations:
Many of the industries in developing countries in which trans­
national corporations have captured;the greatest share of local 
output are those which have contributed most to the rapid growth of 
exports of manufactured goods ... Transnational corporations 
have contributed substantially to this growth, partly because 
of their knowledge of world markets and their ability to meet 
international standards, and partly because imports are needed 
by the integrated network of their activities. On the other hand, 
marketing [advertising etc.] is frequently one of the prime 
obstacles to entry to exporting of indigenous firms. 5)
(2) This structuring of world trade by the multinational corpo­
ration is not only significant for the developing world, but also 
should have a major theoretical and policy-making impact on the 
international economic policies of the OECD countries. Table 2 
below indicates the degree to which U.S. multinationals engage in 
intracompany trade. Eighty-two percent of all goods exported by 
the affiliates of U.S. MNCs in developed countries to the United 
States were in fact inter-firm transfers of goods from affiliates 
to the parent company in the U.S. Such imports accounted for a 
total of 32 per cent of all U.S. imports by value in 1974. The 
proportion is therefore higher with regard to lesser developed 
countries, approaching forty per cent when sales of U.S. affili­
ates in Africa and Asia to their U.S. parents are taken into 
account. ' In the author's opinion, such intracorporate planning
5) UN Commission on Transnational Corporations, Transnational Corporations in 
World Development: A Reexamination, p. 85.
6) Ibid., p. 220. These figures are conservative when one recognizes that the 
operational definition of an affiliate was a company 50 per cent of which 
(or more) is held by an American multinational. Many affiliates of U.S. 
companies are controlled by considerably less. Thus a refining company 
held 33 1/3 per cent apiece by Texaco, Esso, and Chevron would not be re­
gistered as a subsidiary of an American multinational.
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Table 2. Share of intra-company sales of majority-owned foreign affiliates3^ 
of United States-based transnational corporations in their total
7) 
sales, by destination of sales and by country group 1971 and 1975 
(percentage)
Share of affiliate 
exports to parent­
in total affiliate 
exports to the 
United States
Share of affiliate 
exports to other 
affiliates in total 
affiliate exports 
to third countries
19751975Host country and country group 1971 1971
World
Developed market economies
74 74 53 42
Canada 74 61 45 33
Europe 85 87 62 64
Others 62 97 37 32
Total 76 65 60 60
Developing countries
Latin America 69 85 56 73
Africa 79 95 73 74
Middle East 59 43 23 14
Asia 93 100 74 65
Total 69 82 42 30
must certainly thwart conventional balance of payments policy. 
Depending on how much a country was dependent on intracorporate 
trade a devaluation or revaluation of that country's currency 
could well have only a marginal effect on trade flows, trade 
flows being more a function of the manner in which multinational 
corporations structure their intracompany production and trade 
than it is a function of comparative costs.
Interesting as a general discussion of concentration and 
market access might be, such a discussion should also dwell on 
the more particular problems which industrial concentration poses
7) Source: Centre on Transnational Corporations, based on preliminary data 
supplied by the United States Department of Commerce. 
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for the developing nations. To this end, the three examples touch­
ed in the introduction serve admirably — both because oil, tex­
tiles and shipping have been the focus of Third World concern and 
because the problems of access in each of these markets is sub­
stantially different.
2. Access Denied Through Vertical Integration: The International 
Oil Industry
The problem of access to the oil markets of the world should be 
substantially improved for Third World countries. For decades,
8)the oil multinationals, especially the Seven Sisters, ' have se­
cured their dominant position in world markets through controlling 
oil at its source. Through ownership in companies such as Aramco, 
the Kuwait Oil Company, the Iraq Petroleum Company, and Abu 
Dhabi Marine Areas, these companies controlled the majority of 
the crude oil produced in the world at its source, whether in 
the Middle East, in Venezuela, or in Indonesia. Given the wide­
spread OPEC nationalizations in the period 1971-1976, it has been 
widely anticipated that OPEC through its control of the same 
crude oil reservoirs would expand its control to include refin­
ing capacity, tankers, and oil products markets. (At one point, 
in 1974 oil executives were even thinking of looking for other 
jobs).8 9)
To what extent has OPEC managed to overcome oil MNC control in 
downstream markets? Table 3 gives an indication of the major 
trends in industrial concentration since 1963.
8) BP, Royal-Dutch-Shell, Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, Chevron, and Texaco.
9) Interviews. One prominent manager of a major oil company in Denmark even 
contemplated working for a Danish national oil company — seeing such a 
step as inevitable.
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Table 3. Share of activity by ownership3) in the petroleum industry tn market
economies,*3^ )1963,
(Percentage)
1968, .1972, and 19751O)
Activity 1963 1968 1972 1975
Crude oil production
Majors 82 78 73 30
Governments 9 9 12 62
Others 9 13 15 8
Refining
Majors 65 61 ~ 56 47
Governments 14 16 17 24
Others 21 23 27 29
Marketing
Majors . 62 56 54 45
Governments 11 14 15 21
Others 27 31 31 34
production has fallen in twelve years from 82 per cent of the
a) The majors are 
California and
British Petroleum, Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, 
Texaco.
Shell, Standard of
b) Excluding North America.
As can be seen, the oil companies have indeed lost ground. This
is particularly true of the majors. The major' s share of crude oil
total market to 30 per cent in 1975. Their control of refining ca­
pacity has fallen by almost 30 per cent (from 65 per cent of world 
capacity outside the US to 47 per cent of world capacity). There 
was also an additional decline in the marketing shares of these 
companies. In part these declines were due to the rise of other 
oil companies during this period. These — largely those grouped 
under the rubric "other” in Table 3 — have actively competed 
against the Seven Sisters in a wide variety of markets. Although 
hardly household words in Europe, companies such as Phillips Pe­
troleum, Occidental, and Standard Oil of Indiana (Amoco) have done 
very well for themselves.
10) Source: G. Chandler, "The Innocence of Oil Companies", Foreign Policy, 
vol. 27 (Summer 1977), p. 60.
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To accurately measure the growth of influence of OPEC, one must 
pay considerable attention to the "Government" category. Here, 
growth in all stages of the oil industry has been considerable. 
This is true of marketing — where government firms have expanded 
their market share by 91 per cent. It is true as well for refining 
where government activity has expanded by 72 per cent in the 
period 1963 to 1975. Although these percentage increases sound 
formidable, it is well'to bare in mind that the base in 1963 was 
extremely small. Then governments possessed no more than a 14 
per cent share in refining and a 11 per cent share in marketing. 
(Therefore increases to 24 per cent and 21 per cent shares re­
spectively yield a very high rate of increase).
But it is in the crude oil producing operations where govern­
mental activity has taken the biggest jump — from a nine per 
cent share in 1968 to a 62 per cent share in 1975 — a 588 per cent 
increase'.
Is the oil industry the exception to the rule? Does the loosen­
ing of oil industry concentration mena that the lesser developed 
nations have gained access to developed markets? The answer, cu­
riously enough, in view of the statistics just presented is "no" 
to both questions.
The reason for this apparesnt contradiction lies in the fact 
that in the areas of refining and marketing, the government firms 
which have enlarged their market shares are overwhelmingly those 
government firms located in the developed OECD nations, firms 
such as the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi in Italy, Elf-ERAP in 
France, Petrofina in Belgium, and Deminex-Veba in Germany. Of the 
refining capacity designated "other" and "government" in Table 
3 some 76 per cent is located in the OECD nations. A goodly pro­
portion of the remaining refinery capacity is not located in 
OPEC nations. Of those Third World refineries which are involved 
in the export of oil products, some 40 per cent are located in 
non-OPEC nations, off-shore centers convenient for tanker routes 
(and lax environmental restrictions) — the Bahamas, the Nether­
lands Antilles, Trinidad, and Singapore. A goodly portion of 
this capacity is not owned by Third World Governments, but by the 
multinational oil companies. In any case, it hardly makes a 
difference. Only ten per cent of the world's oil in 1974 was 
refined in export oriented refineries.
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Nor does OPEC access to upstream crude oil refineries and 
markets have any apparent prospect of improving. Of the new re­
finery capacity currently planned, only 26 per cent will be lo­
cated in the Third World. This lack of penetration to "downstream" 
markets on the part of OPEC renders less meaning to their enhanced 
control over crude oil. Oil company opposition to allowing fully 
integrated operations fall into the hands of OPEC nations and the 
prospect of higher profits in the petrochemical industry has led 
OPEC nations to abandon oil product markets. These markets remain 
inaccessible and increasingly account for the major share of oil 
company profits. Rather, "ownership" of crude oil reserves has led 
these countries to contractual relationships with the oil multi­
nationals, a contractual relationship which reflects a curious sym­
biotic relationship between the major OPEC producers and the 
oil multinationals. Cries of nationalization have increasingly 
been replaced by open admiration at the marketing skills of an 
Exxon, a Chevron or a BP. Ultimate OPEC access to oil product 
markets remains as much a "will-o-the-wisp" in 1978 as it did in 
1973 before the Arab-Israeli conflict.
3. Concentration and "Export Platforms": The Textile Industry
Of the various industries thought to be ideal for the Third World, 
the complex of activities designated generally "textiles" takes 
a preeminent position. Although generalization in a field as com­
plex as textiles is somewhat hazardous, one could question this 
assumption. The assumption is questionable on two accounts: first­
ly, there is little to indicate that natural fibres, cotton, 
jute, and sisal, the product of the developing world, will out- 
compete man-made fibres — a highly concentrated Western indu­
strial sector; secondly, although the labour forces of nations such 
as Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore can be employed in the garment 
making sector, there is little to indicate that this redounds to 
the benefit of indigenous industry; all too often, these nations 
merely become "export platforms" for large European, Japanese, or 
American multinational firms. Let us examine each of these 
contentions:
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3.1. Natural versus Man-Made Fibres; The Problem of Concentration 
The expansion of synthetic fabrics — produced from man-made fibres 
is a well known phenomenon. From a high of about 83.3 per cent 
of all fibres produced in 1952, wool and cotton have slipped to a 
59.6 per cent share of world consumption in 1973. The production 
of man-made fibres have increased 240 per cent — from a 1952 
market share of 16.7 per cent to a 1971 total of 40.3 per cent. 
This trend was reflected in the textile industry. Average growth 
rates for synthetic textiles during this period were on the order 
of 21.5 per cent per annum; in contrast, consumption of wool and 
cotton textiles grew at an annual rate of 2.3 per cent.
Yet even more distressing than the substitution of highly con­
centrated industrial man-made fibres for cotton and wool is the 
impact which this substitution has had on Third World exports to 
developed nations. Table 4 shows that by value, sixty per cent of 
the yarn fabrics and clothing exported from the Third World in 
1971 consisted of man-made fibres. Thus in the very area where 
according to classical trade theory and the theory of factor pro­
portions the Third World should possess a degree of comparative 
advantage, it eschews this advantage for man-made fibres which for 
the most part must be imported into Third World countries before 
manufacture and further sale to the Western World.
To state that the man-made fibre industry is highly concentrated 
is to verge on understatement. The man-made fibre industry in 
Europe is dominated by eight firms. The largest three firms produce 
nearly 45 per cent of the European total: AKZO, ICI, and Rhone 
Poulenc. Nationally the concentration is even greater. In France 
alone, Rhone Poulenc accounts for 86 per cent of the French capa­
city, employing 75 per cent of the people working in the man-made 
fibre sector. ICI and Cortaulds between them account for slightly 
less of the British market. The latter of these two firms is re­
markable in that it is a textile firm which integrated into man­
made fibres, normally a preserve of the petrochemical industry. 
Cortaulds not only controls about 28 per cent of the man-malde 
fibre market in the UK but also are significant garment manufactu-
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(Thousands of US dollars)
Table 4. Imports of cotton and man-made fibre textiles and clothing by develop­
ed market economy countries from developing countries by country of 










Brazil 5,373 7,975 477 919 248 14,992 1.9
Colombia 3,772 6,760 305 1 * 34 10,872 1.4
Egypt 11,698 8,358 150 6 23 20,235 2.6
Hong Kong 4,780 83,484 263,942 25,313 7,773 385,292 49.0
India 4,491 39,968 10,734 13,524 2,105 70,822 9.0
Israel 3,553 1,603 5,752 125 206 11,239 1.4
Malaysia - 2,387 3,352 118 97 5,954 0.8
Mexico 6,416 8,358 1,378 29 472 16,653 2.1
Pakistan 11,669 37,386 3,931 1,584 1,076 55,646 7.1
Rep. of Korea 13,113 18,953 8,828 891 984 42,769 5.4
Singapore - 3,646 12.003 1,109 35 16,793 2.1
Yugoslavia 7,288 18,974 20,268 1,697 567 48,794 6.2
Other develop-
ing countries 10,947 45,948 24,680 2,384 1,780 85,739 10.9
or territories




Yarn Fabrics Clothing Total Per cent 
of total
Brazil 1,521 37 2,689 4,247 0.4
Colombia - 1,381 1,381 0.1
Egypt 159 - 4 163
Hong Kong 1,741 11,696 554,522 567,959 47.4
India 1,336 1,877 5,606 8,819 0.7
Israel 12,064 2,012 42,018 56,094 4.7
Malaysia - - 2,125 2,125 0.2
Mexico 1,609 — 35,080 35,689 3.0
Pakistan - 332 522 854 0.1
Rep. of Korea 14,434 4,967 219.997 239.398 K 20.0
Singapore - 14,752 14,752 1.2
Yugoslavia 1,573 3,944 92,387 97,904 8.2
Other develop-
ing countries 5,163 5,135 158,717 169,015 14.1
or territories
Total 39,600 30,000 1,128,800 1,198,400 100.0
11) Source: UNCTAD, Trade and Development Board, International Trade in Tex­
tiles and the Developing Countries: Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat 
(June 19, 1974: TD/B/C.2/136), pp. 22-23.
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12) 
rers, and textile wholesalers. ' There has historically been a 
high degree of cartelization in the man-made fibre market, a mar­
ket characterized by "international market-sharing reinforced by
13) cross licensing".
The extreme concentration of the man-made fibre industry is 
matched elsewhere only by concentration in the thread making indu­
stry. Here, together with Tootal, the British industrial firm Coats 
Patton enjoys a virtual world monopoly.
This is not to say that man-made fibres are immune to substitu­
tion from natural fibres. But it is remarkable how with the changed 
situation after the oil crisis — the rise of oil prices affected 
the costs of synthetic fibres many of which are based on petroleum 
derivatives -- the decline in this industrial sector has occasion­
ed widespread declarations on the part of European governments to 
the extent that these have waived EEC rules on cartelization and
14) are now busily organizing the European markets. The degree to 
which this organization will benefit man-made fibres to the cost 
of natural fibres will be an interesting facet of this carteliza­
tion .
3.2. The Garment/Textile Manufacturing Industry: Export Platforms?
To focus on concentration in the man-made fibres industry is not 
to claim that other areas of textile industrial activity are free 
from concentration. In the garment manufacturing sector, for example 
depending on the particular market and the particular country 
there can well be a high degree of concentration.
In the U.S. the giant,Burlington Industries, dominates, but 
there are also firms such as Vanity Fair, Blue Bell, Levi Strauss, 
Jantzen, and United Merchants and Manufacturers. In France, in 
addition to Rhone Poulanc, there are also Agache Willot and Lainiere 
de Roubais Provoust Masurel. Besides the British giants already
12) Brian Bolton, The MNCs in the Textile, Garment, and Leather Industries, 
SecondWorld Congress, International Textile, Garment, and Leather Workers 
Federation, Du lin, 22nd to 26th March 1976, p. 11.
13) Pickering, Industrial Structure and Market Conduct, London, Martin Robert- 
sen, 1973, p. 269.
14) This can also be seen in the limitations which OECD nations have placed on 
textile imports from the Third World in the most recent GATT Multi-Fibre 
Agreement.
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mentioned, there is also Illingworth and Morris, and Montagu Bur­
ton. (The number of large textile companies quoted on the British 
stock exchange fell from 214 to 126 in the period 1958-1968; the 
five largest among these are estimated to hold well over 50 per 
cent of the market)
Many of these larger firms rely heavily on production from the 
Third World. Triumph International (West Germany) in 1973 sold 
the equivalent of 663 million DM of textiles and clothing, 47 per 
cent of which came from overseas operations.^) coats Pattons 
derives 81 per cent of its profits from overseas. Although these 
percentages are perhaps exceptional for European firms, there is 
not a single one of the major textile multinationals which does 
have plants in the Third World. This tendency is particularly 
market for the Japanese conglomerates: Asahi, Kanebo-Teijin, Toyobo- 
Mitsubishi, Kura-Toray-Unitika, and Mitsubishi-Toweto.
Slightly over 63 per cent of clothing and textile exports from 
the Third World in 1972 came from four countries: Hong Kong, Korea, 
Singapore, and Malaysia. Of these, foreign participation and 
ownership were particularly noticeable in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Hong Kong, the most significant Third World exporter (2o per cent 
by value in 19 72) , is largely dependent on a series of trading 
firms for its access to markets. Originally, largely British com­
panies, these now include import firms, department store buyers, 
mail-ordercompanies and the like. These account for almost three 
quarters of Hong Kong's exports). It might reasonably be said 
that Hong Kong performs the role of a subcontractor for the deve­
loped market economies. Foreign multinational holdings in the 
Singapore textile industry (second to Hong Kong-18 per cent of the 
value of 1972 lesser developed countries exports), has been esti-
17) mated to lie around the 60 per cent mark. In Korea, the share 
of employment by multinational corporations increased from 3 to 
11 per cent in the period 1970-1973. This may not seem signifi­
cant but for the fact that the industrial sector accounts for no 
more than 23 per cent of the South Korean GDP. The percentage of
15) Brian Bolton, op.cit., p. vi.
16) Ibid., p. 39.
17) UN Commission on Transnational Corporations, op.cit., p. 92. 
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textiles and clothing in total Korean exports was 30 per cent in 
1972.
Outside this area, investment by large textile combines tends 
towards geographical orientation. The Japanese concentrate on 
East Asia; the Americans focus on Latin America and Southern Europe; 
and the European textile manufacturers rely on Southern Europe, Africa, 
and Latin America. The list of European, Japanese and American 
subsidiaries in these geographical regions is truly impressive. 7
To sum up the nature of the textile industry, one might say 
that concentration exists at the two industrial extremes — man­
made fibres, on the one hand and garment retailing on the other. 
These sectors present a formidable barrier to Third World entry 
into the textile industry as a whole — a barrier which the various 
institutionalized GATT agreements on textiles has left untouched. 
Concentration in the textile industry will probably continue to 
have mixed effects on the Third World exporters, at best confining 
them to the role of contractual suppliers to OECD markets, at 
worst, closing off even that avenue of access.
4. International Shipping: The Tyranny of the Many
If market structure prevents access vertically in the case of the 
oil MNC, and through concentration in the case of textiles, the 
situation is considerably different in the case of international 
shipping.
That UNCTAD should single international shipping out as a par­
ticular area of interest of Third World countries is only natural. 
For many of these countries, the cost of transportation is a sig­
nificant portion of export prices, particularly in the case of 
the baser raw materials, for which the presence of synthetic sub­
stitutes in the OECD countries puts a ceiling on prices. Table 5 
below illustrates the impact of liner freight rates for such com­
modities .
18) See for example, Brian Bolton, op.cit., pp. 6-45.
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Table 5. Liner Freight Rates as Percentage of UK Import PricesT—r —-------- £------------
between 1951 and 1963 ;
Freight % at 
highest price
Freight % at 
lowest price
Hemp (Manila) 8 15
Copra (Philippines) 7 22
Rubber (Malaysia) 2 5
Tin (Malaysia) 2 4
Jute (Pakistan) 5 11
Sisal (E. Africa) 4 * 13
Cocoa beans (Nigeria) 1.3 4.7
The shipping market is generally composed of several component 
parts: the first and most important is the petroleum and crude 
carrier market, the second, the liner market, and the third, the 
tramping market. If we ignore the carriage of crude which is some­
thing of an exception, the significance of the tramp market and the 
liner market can be seen in table 6. Broadly speaking these are 
the markets which UNCTAD has focused upon.
Table 6. Total Volume of Dry Cargo Carried in 1962 by Type of
r, ■ 20)Carrier
Carried by: Tonnage:




Open market tramps 120 million tons
Totals 585 million tons
Tramps are generally dry cargo vessels which operate on a world 
wide basis under charter to the nationals of the countries which
19) Source: A.D. Couper, The Geography of Sea Transport, London' Hutchinson, 
1972, p. 182.
20) Source: Olav Knudsen, The Politics of International Shipping, New York, 
D.C. Heath, 1973, p. 46.
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desire their services. The tramp ship owner attempts to arrange 
charters for his vessels so that they move around the world, mini­
mizing their empty travel and following various shifts of supply 
and demand. The tramping fleet amounts to roughly 20 per cent of 
total world tonnage. Specialization and progress have reduced 
tramping's size. Still, tramps still perform an essential function 
2D
particularly in the shipment of.grain.
Of more concern to developing nations are the conventional liner 
services. These have been developed to suit the needs of modern 
industry: frequency of deliveries, regularity of contact with a 
wide variety of markets. Such specialized carriage also suited many 
Third World countries and cargo liners were designed to carry a 
wide variety of commodities. Yet what the shipper and importer 
gain through regularly provided services, the liner operator is 
liable to lose through loss of cargo. As expressed by Knudsen: 
"He [the liner operator] has no way of systematically relating 
his costs to the act of physically moving a particular item of cargo 
from one place to another. Yet cargo is his only source of in-
22) come". The result has been to organize into liner conferences. 
There are currently between 350 and 400 of these organizations.
Access to shipping for the Third World is related, first and 
foremost, to the problem of liner conferences. It might also be 
secondarily linked to the difficulties of building one's own 
national fleet on a competitive basis. Such an enterprise requires 
capital and skill.
4.1. The Problem of Liner Conferences
What exactly is a "liner conference"?
A conference is an association of competing liner owners engaged 
in a particular trade who have agreed to limit the competition 
existing among themselves ... to the agreement forswearing all 
forms of price competition may --- added an agreement to regulate
sailings according to a predetermined pattern ... A further step 
may be to add a full pooling agreement under which profits and 
and losses on the trade covered by the conferences are shared
21) Couper, op.cit., p. 94.
22) Knudsen, op.cit., p. 59. 
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between the member lines. When this stage is reached competition 
between the conference lines has ceased completely. 23)
Are conferences in fact transportation monopolies which charge 
discriminatory rates in order to cover the costs of their regular 
services? If so, what limits should there be placed on the arbitrari­
ness of their rates so as not to disadvantage Third World countries 
as against others? These questions have lead to the spilling of 
much ink. In fact, there are theoretical limits to the freight 
rates which a liner conference can charge a country such as Ghana. 
These limits are those imposed by the usage of tramp services. 
Such limits, however, depend on two factors: (1) the tramp service 
is available and imposes no other serious restraint on the shipper 
and (2) that information is available as to the presence of both 
the demand and supply of tramp steamers for a certain trade.
Despite disclaimers from the developed world, there can be 
little doubt that liner conference have the potential to exact 
unfair fees for the services which they provide the Third World. 
This potential is amply demonstrated in Table 7. What is impressive 
about the list of characteristics in Table 7 is the high degree of 
secrecy inherent in the liner conferences system. The conference 
agreement is regarded as a confidential document; relationships 
with shippers are no less secret; freight rates are unilaterally 
imposed on a confidential basis; the conferences have provisions 
which are designed to prevent outside competition and so forth. 
The list of practices is too long for detailed comment. Of parti­
cular importance, however, is the practice of "deferred rebates". 
Under this system the shipper in the underdeveloped country pays 
the full freight rates demanded by the liner conference, but 
if he subscribes to a loyalty period of one year (during which 
he will continue to use the conference's services), he recieves' 
ten per cent of the payments which he has made in the first half 
of the year back as a rebate at the end of the year. "The con­
ference is, in other words, always six months in arrears in its 
payments of refunds to the shipper. Should the shipper violate 
the contract, however, he loses not only the rebates', he has earned








(a) Membership Closed conference with confidential criteria for the ad­
mission, withdrawal or expulsion of members
(b) Share of trade The basis for the allocation of shares of cargo to mem­
bers is usually kept confidential
(c) Pooling Confidential cargo or revenue pooling agreements cover 
the shares of cargo or revenue due to each member line; 
sometimes there is provision to ensure the carriage of 
low-rated cargo
(d) Sactions Agreements provide for sanctions against breaches of
agreement by member lines
(e) Self-policing Self-policing machinery exists to ensure compliance with 
the terms of conference agreements








Contents of agreements are confidential .
shippers
(a) Loyalty Loyalty arrangements comprise fidelity clauses and ties
arrangements with shippers (dual rate system, contract system and de­
ferred rebate system)
(b) Dispensation There are no arrangements for giving reasonably prompt 
dispensation to loyal shippers to use non-conference 
vessels




No provision for publication is usually made
(d) Consultation There is general concentration of authority at head-
machinery quarters
(e) Representation There is no representation of merchant interests in rates 
and other conference committees
Freight rates
(a) General freight Freight rates are imposed unilaterally; the basis for
rate increases freight rate changes is confidential. There are usually 
no specific provisions for determining freight rates, and 
usually no procedures for prior consultation. The time of 




(b) Specific freight 
rates
There are procedures for determining freight rates on 
new cargo items and handling requests from shippers for 
reductions of specific freight rates, but no procedures 
for consultation on increases of specific freight rates
(c) Promotional 
freight rates
There are usually no specific provisions for determining 
promotional freight rates








Procedures for consultation existing in Western Europe 
in connexion with devaluation or revaluation of tariff 
currencies do not seem to operate effectively. There are 
no procedures regarding floating currencies
Other matters
(a) Outside com- 
petition
There are devices to prevent or eliminate outside com­
petition
(b) Averaging of 
freight rates
There is provision for the averaging of freight rates 
over port ranges
(c) Quality of 
service
There is usually no provision regarding the type or 
other characteristics of the shipping to be used
(d) Adequacy of 
service
Implementation
The responsibility for providing adequate service usually 
rests with individual lines
(a) Settlement of 
disputes
There is provision for impartial adjudication machinery
in the current half year, but also the entire refund due to him
2 5)from the previous half year”. This is only one of the more du­
bious of several "tying arrangements" between conferences and 
shippers which guarantee the former a continued clientele.
4.2. The Building of a National Fleet
A national fleet poses several advantages to developing nations: 
it enables the developing nations to retain earnings from their
24) Source: UNCTAD Secretariat, The Regulation of Liner Conferences, New York, 
1972, TD 104/Rev. 1, p. 5.
25) Knudsen, op.cit., p. 61.
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exports which they might otherwise lose to foreign shipping lines; 
a national fleet also can be used to combat questionable shipping 
practices (such as those imposed by liner conferences; a national 
fleet finally can minimize a nation's import bill.
Off-setting these advantages, however, there are severe struc­
tural problems associated with the development of a national fleet, 
the two most serious being a lack of capital and a lack of highly 
skilled manpower.
The capital intensiveness of the shipping industry is relatively 
high compared to most other alternative investments which might be 
made. Not only are ships relatively expensive compared to other 
investments but the building up of a national fleet involves con­
siderable foreign exchange costs. The Third World in this respect 
is confronted with the heavily subsidized, government supported 
and financed ship building industries in the developed world. Of 
the world's major ship builders, virtually all have more than three 
forms of government assistance. Table 8 in addition to illustrating
26)Table 8. Government Assistance to Shipbuilding
Countries Forms of Assistance
HA B c D E F G
Denmark X X X X X
France X X X X X X X
Italy X X X X X
Japan X X X X
Netherlands X X X X X
Norway X X X X X X X
Spain X X X X
United Kingdom X X X X X X X X
Sweden X X X X X
United States X X X X X X
West Germany X X X X X X
Key: A = operation and crew subsidies E = guarantee for finance
B = construction subsidies F = public ownership
C = tax/customs measures G = export credit facilities
D = finance for investment research H = home credit facilities
26) Source: I. Chrzanowski, Concentration and Centralization of Capital in Ship- 
building, Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1975, p. 163. 
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the wide prevalence of shipbuilding subsidies also gives an im­
pression of the degree of government intervention into areas such 
as operations subsidies which are connected only tangentially with 
subsidized ship construction. The result of these measures is ul­
timately discouraging for any nation planning to build its own 
national fleet. This has been true as well of some of the OPEC 
nations. Algeria has abandoned its plans to build its own fleet 
of liquid natural gas tankers. When asked the reason why, one 
Algerian authority responded frankly that his government could 
not compete with the subsidized yards elsewhere. "The Algerian 
national fleet will have its own tankers, but these are being built
27) at La Ciotat, a French yard".
As difficult a problem to entering the international shipping 
market is the lack of skilled manpower: "... together with a scar­
city of capital, the shortage of skilled seamen and officers, of 
entrepreneurs and of managerial personnel, is the principal ob­
stacle to the establishment of merchant marines in the developing
28)countries". ; Even in areas where the interest in national lines 
has not been hindered by lack of capital and access to ships, the 
lack of operating personnel has constituted a hindrance to the 
development of national lines. Thus within the OPEC nations many 
have adapted a policy of shipping cooperation with the oil multi-
29) nationals through joint enterprise companies.
In spite of these considerable barriers, the Third World has 
had some success in dealing with the developed nations shipping 
industry. While the problem of access has not been solved, UNCTAD 
has sponsored a series of measures which hold some promise. To 
counteract the liner conferences, the UN has adopted a code of 
conduct; to counter practices such as deferred rebates, the UN 
has encouraged the development of shippers councils, national 
shipper groupings which can negotiate with liners councils from 
positions of strength. To counteract some of the problems of deve­
loping national shipping lines, UNCTAD has explored the possibility
27) Interview information, London, September , 1977.
28) UNCTAD Secretariat, Multinational shipping enterprises, Geneva, UNCTAD, 
1972, 72.II.D17 TD/B/C.4/68, p. 6.
29) This is particularly the case with Saudi Arabia and its relations to the 
oil MNCs within Aramco.
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of setting up multinational shipping lines, shipping lines in which 
various Third World countries pool their resources, for mutual bene­
fit .
Yet in spite of this progress, the Third World has a long way 
to go. An UNCTAD recommendation that liner traffic ownership should 
be divided 40 per cent to exporting nations, 40 per cent to import­
ing nations and 20 per cent to "other",3°^ (a state corresponding 
to the share of the Third World in actual quantities of goods car­
ried) has thus far been signed by only West Germany, France and 
Belgium. The European Community has taken these signatures with 
deep reservations — in fact "rapping the knuckles" of the sign- 
ing nations. In fact there appears to be as much difficulty in 
Third World access to international shipping markets as there is 
to Third World access to final textile and oil products markets.
5. Conclusion: Market Structure — A Third Analytic Approach?
Discussion around the implementation of the United Nations New 
International Economic Order might be said to concentrate methodo­
logically on polar opposites: the equilibrium theory of inter­
national trade as developed by Western economists, and the theory 
of dependency as propounded by a host of Third World theoreticians.
"Market structure" or more formally defined: "The underlying 
characteristics of a market which determines the competitive re-
32) lations between sellers or between buyers and sellers", has 
been the focus of our analysis — in particular the all-important 
problem of access. As a concept, market structure has little ex­
planatory power. Rather it is largely a descriptive concept laying 
great emphasis on such market characteristics as size-distribution 
of firms, size-distribution of buyers, barriers to entry of new 
buyers and sellers, degree of product differentiation, vertical 
and horizontal integration, and degree of capital intensiveness.
30) "Cross carriers" — those ship owners whose nations are not directly involved 
in the trade. This arrangement in fact discriminates against these owners.
31) "U.S. Shipping Policy Hits Trade Relations", Financial Times, June 6, 1978, 
p. 44.
32) G. Bannock, R.E. Baxter, and R. Rees, A Dictionary of Economics, Harmonds- 
worth, Penguin Books, 1974, p. 274.
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In the context of this short article, we have applied one aspect 
of market structure, that of market access to bring Third World 
trade problems more clearly in focus. To this end we have perhaps 
too briefly described market structure in the oil industry, tex­
tiles, and shipping. What remains is to discuss the greater theo­
retical implications of this analysis.
Analysis of North-South problems from the point of view of 
market structure poses some decided advantages for classical inter­
national trade theoreticians. To take an extreme example, let us 
assume that there are two types of trade — the first is an ex­
change of goods and- payments between two independent entities in 
two different nations; the second an exchange of goods and payments 
between two branches of a single corporation each located in a 
different country. Classical trade theory to date has generally 
failed to observe that there are differences in the two types of 
trade. That is to say, classical international trade theory is 
based more on the exchange of goods and services than on a concern 
as to who benefits from the exchange. International economists will 
be quick to point out that both parties to trade benefit irrespec­
tive of whether they are two branches of the same firm located in 
two countries or they are in reality separate entities.
Yet it is precisely here where the market structure perspective 
is perhaps the most useful. Whether accepted or not by Western 
economists, most Third World countries would claim that there is 
a difference between the two types of exchange described. To this 
interchange of views, the analysis of market structure raises the 
following questions:
(1) Is there a substantial difference between the multiplier 
effect of international trade as classically conceived and that of 
international trade between subsidiaries of the same multinational 
corporation? There could be considerable evidence that such a 
difference does exist, if only in the ability of horizontally or 
vertically integrated affiliates to make use of transfer prices,
33) to evade national taxes through interfirm cash flows, and to
33) This tendency is not reserved to lesser developed nations. The British were 
astonished in 1971 to find that the oil MNCs were piling up losses and 
charging them to their British subsidiaries so that the latter could avoid 
British North Sea taxes.
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repatriate their profits (thereby depriving the host economies of 
reinvested earnings).
(2) To what degree are the classical remedies to national ba­
lance of payments — devaluation or revaluation thwarted by a high 
degree of concentration internationally? The degree to which a 
nation's imports and exports are determined by intra-firm trade 
within one or more multinational corporations, the concept of com­
parative advantage may not matter overly much. The degree to which 
Coates Patton has placed its factories in Spain and depends on 
these factories for its European sales, for example, locks Coates 
Patton into a certain pattern of production on which a revaluation 
or devaluation of the Spanish peseta may only have a marginal 
effect. The same characteristic is probably even more true of the 
oil MNCs.
(3) And, finally, the question which we have posed in this essay, 
to what gain can lesser developed nations utilize tariff prefer­
ences, and the abolition of other national barriers if they are 
prevented from marketing their exports through a high degree of 
concentration in the European and American markets. One might even 
go so far as to question if the ultimate beneficiaries of tariff 
reductions are not the indigeneous industries in the Third World 
but those multinational corporations which have established them­
selves in the Third World to use Third World preferences to export 
to their home markets. Here however there is unquestionably a lack 
of evidence pro or con:
If the problem with classical trade theory is that despite its 
high degree of theoretical rigour, it ignores the problem of who 
benefits through asserting that all benefit, one might well argue 
that the problem with dependency theories lies in its emphasis on 
the structural exchange relationship. The author will eschew any 
extensive treatment of dependency theory in this context. (Other 
contributions made to this issue are devoted to this question). 
Yet, it could be argued that the great advantage of dependency 
theory, its global nature, is also a disadvantage. To illustrate, 
one need only take the solutions to break Third World dependency 
as porposed by Oswaldo Sunkel. The solutions sound grand: the 
breaking of multinational corporate controls in traditional ex­
porting sectors through state intervention in the first instance, 
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or through nationalization in the last instance; the creation of 
large specialized industrial units capable of securing economies 
of scale - multinational Latin American firms which would•develop 
Latin American markets. The problem with these solutions is that 
they do not face the critical questions: what is the degree of 
developed nation control of the product markets within the tradi­
tional export markets? To what degree do large Latin American mul­
tinational firms stand a chance competing with the MNCs from the 
developed world both within Latin America and within the more im­
portant world markets? Or to take more concrete examples, to what 
degree could the problems of Chilean copper on world markets have 
been avoided after the Allende nationalizations? To what degree 
could a Latin American automobile firm enter Latin American markets 
and outcompete General Motors, Ford, Datsun, and Fiat? Sunkel's 
remedies offer no solutions to problems such as these. Here, it is 
suggested, an awareness of market structure would add empirical 
depth to what is largely today a macro-theory.
Finally one could well ask if market structure presents an in­
teresting focus on its own. In particular, such an approach raises 
questions about the role of international oligopolies and how these 
influence international trade. "As multinational companies become 
increasingly important, so a new form of oligopoly arises, the 
oligopoly of international markets", writes J.F. Pickering, in a
34) recent textbook on industrial structure and market control. 
Unfortunately this "new form of oligopoly" merits no more than a 
page of comment. The application of oligopoly theory to inter­
national trade remains a largely unwritten chapter in international 
political economy despite the efforts of Stephen Hymer and a few
35)others. The use of market strucutre could well be one manner
34) Industrial Structure and Market Conduct, op.cit., p. 269.
35) See for example, Stephen Hymers publications: The International Operations 
of National Firms: A Study of Direct Foreign Investment, Cambridge, MIT, 
1976, "The Multinational Corporation: An Analysis of Some Motives for Inter­
national Business Integration", Revue Economique, XIX, nr. 6, November 1968, 
"The Efficiency (Contradictions) of the Multinational Corporation", Papers 
and Proceedings of the American Economic Association, May 1970. "Multina­
tional Corporations and International Oligopoly: The Non-American Challenge", 
in C.P. Kindleberger, ed., The International Corporation, Cambridge, MIT, 
1970.
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of meeting the need to study international trade in the focus of 
oligopoly relationships.
